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The relationship between law and morality has never been
terribly clear in the American mind. On one hand, there has been
the attempt simply to identify the two. On the otherhand, there
has existed a deep suspicion of all attempts to relate the two.
Traditional Western jurisprudence, at least before Austin, tried
to follow a middle course between these two extremes. It is partic-
ularly important today, when law occupies such an important
dimension in American life, that lawyers once again reexamine
this relationship. Law is infinitely more than procedural tech-
nique; but it is something less than a religion or an ethical sys-
tem. Law presupposes an ethical system and attempts to main-
tain and promote that system in the concrete lives of citizens.
Law is, above all else, a teacher. This essential core of a legal
system often is forgotten, to the confusion and detriment of that
system.
I.
"Morality" is only slightly less difficult to define than "law."
We know, however, there is an intimate and inextricable relation-
ship between the two. It is like defining the relationship between
church and state: the relationship is clear and the balancing deli-
cate; if one is absorbed in the other, the result is tyranny, or
superstition, or both. One cannot be absorbed by the other and
if it is, we have neither church nor state.' The relationship of law
and morals, similarly, is one of tandem and tension.
Both law and morals concern who and what man is, that is,
human existence. Although wolves do not argue about the merit
of running in packs, man always argues about, and seeks to de-
fine, his existence. It is this very quest that defines man as
human. Man is free, therefore he is responsible and moral; man
relates to others in community, therefore he needs law whereby
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his freedom and his relationships can be channeled for their max-
imization.2 Freedom and law are both a possibility and a limit.
That is what the medieval schoolmen meant when they said that
man achieves his highest freedom only under law; homo liber et
legalis.3 Without law, man falls into the confusion of anarchy or
into the tryranny of the stronger.
To be free does not mean the ability to choose one course of
action over another; to say man is free to choose in this way really
means that these choices are acts of will that aim at achieving a
certain end, and to which man bends his energies or focuses his
enthusiasms. But all these acts of will we call expressions of free-
dom, already presuppose man understands what freedom is. To
be free is to be able to find meaning and give significance to our
existence .4 Law is one aspect of that endeavor in that law embod-
ies the moral values that give a society significance and meaning
in history.
It should therefore be clear that any and every law imposes
some moral vision, explicit or implicit, against which the law is
judged. It is not true to say the law itself is morally indifferent
even though the various principles of interpretation and applica-
tion might well be. Law always refers to some moral vision. The
law is teacher to the extent it instructs us about the moral order
we hold as a society. Morality and legality are mutually depen-
dent phenomena in every society. And because man is a limited
being, he can only be legally free.
Man is limited in relation both to himself and to others; it is
here we encounter the relationship between morals and law. Law
regulates relationships of diverse kinds: for example, persons,
groups, families, property, estates, crimes, and commerce. Man
does not possess unlimited freedom, but freedom in relationship
to other human beings who are his moral and legal equals under
2. Thomas Aquinas speaks of this polarity of freedom and relatedness:
Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine Providence in
the most excellent way, insofar as it partakes of a share of Providence, by being
provident both for itself and for others. . . . [Tjhe Psalmist . . . thus implies
that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is
evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint
on us of the divine light.
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-IH, q. 91, art. 2 [hereinafter cited as SuMMA THEOLOGiCA].
Man is therefore both free and responsible.
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM OF OCCAM, DIALOGUS I-VII, ch. 73. For an overall view of this
medieval theory, see G. DELAGARDE, LA MORALE ET LE DROrr 48-67 (1949).




the law. Here lies the touchstone of the whole democratic legal
system, which becomes legitimate only by the consent of the
governed. The people have to first consent in some way to give
any human meaning to laws.' Thus, the relationship between law
and morals touches a profound cord in human evolution. Man is
free, but limitedly free; man in freedom relates to his equals in
freedom, but is limited by the very nature of the freedom and the
relationship. Therefore, the nature of human relationships de-
mands law; without law there is no freedom, only the rule of the
strongest.
All of this is not terribly novel to Americans living under
limited government, each equal to one another under the law.
Lawful freedoms are always possessed in association with one's
fellows. The American notion of the relationship between law and
morals was not concocted from the top of the brain rationalism
of the eighteenth century (Aufklarung) which purported to start
de novo. Rather, it reflects a historical product, woven through
the bloody pages of history: the concept of limited freedom under
limited government under law freely consented to by individuals
who only through this consent become a people. In a true sense,
this people rules itself.
The American proposition, in reviving the distinction be-
tween society and state that had perished under Absolutism, like-
wise renewed the principle of government's incompetence to legis-
late religion and thought. Government submits itself to judgment
by the truth in society; it is not itself a judge of the truth in
society. Freedom of the means of communication, whereby ideas
are circulated and criticized, and the freedom of the academy
(the range of institutions organized for the pursuit of truth and
the perpetuation of the intellectual heritage of society), as well
as the freedom of the church, are immune from legal inhibition
or governmental control. This immunity is a civil right of the first
order, essential to the American concept of a free people under a
limited government. Its shorthand version is the first amendment
to the United States Constitution.
II.
The very notion of a "free people" has a special meaning in
the United States. Part of the inner structure of the American
ideal of freedom, as old as Western jurisprudence itself, has been
the profound conviction that only a virtuous people can be free.
5. See generally A. BERLE, POwER WiTHOUT PROPERTY 18-24 (1959).
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It is not an American belief that free government is inevitable;
only that it is possible, and that its possibility can be realized
only when the people as a whole are inwardly governed by recog-
nized imperatives of universal moral law: "The constitution
makes our conventional political morality relevant to the ques-
tion of validity; any statute that appears to compromise that
morality raises constitutional questions, and if the compromise is
serious, the constitutional doubts are serious also."' The idea that
only a virtuous people can be free is not novel to American juris-
prudence; in Western Culture, that idea goes back to Plato and
Aristotle.
The American experiment reposes on Lord Acton's postulate
that freedom is the highest phase of civil society.' It also reposes
on Lord Acton's further postulate that the elevation of a people
to this highest phase of social life supposes, as its condition, that
they understand the ethical nature of political freedom. I The peo-
ple claim this freedom, in all its articulated forms, in the face of
government; in the name of this freedom, multiple limitations are
put upon the power of government. But the claim can be made
with the full resonance of moral authority only to the extent it
issues from an inner sense of responsibility to a higher law. In its
highest phase of freedom, civil society demands that law should
not be imposed from the top down, but should spontaneously
flower outward from free obedience to the restraints and impera-
tives that stem from inwardly possessed moral principles. The
success of a political experiment depends upon the virtue of the
people who undertake it.
Likewise, institutions that would pretend to be free with
human freedom must in their workings be governed from within
and made to serve the ends of freedom. Political freedom is en-
dangered in its foundations when universal moral values, upon
whose shared possession the self-discipline of a free society de-
pends, are no longer vigorous enough to restrain the passions of
greed and shatter the selfish inertia of men.
As Learned Hand so ably stated:
You may ask what then will become of the fundamental princi-
ples of equity and fair play which our constitutions enshrine;
and whether I seriously believe that unsupported they will serve
merely as counsels of moderation. I do not think that anyone can
6. Dworkin, On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience, in TRIALS OF THE RESISTANCE 53
(1970).
7. LORD AcTON, LECTURES ON MODERN HISTORY 26 (1960).
8. Id. at 27, 43-44.
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say what will be left of those principles; I do not know whether
they will serve only as counsels; but this I think I do know-that
a society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court
can save; that a society where the spirit flourishes, no court need
save; that in a society which evades its responsibility by thrust-
ing upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the
end will perish.'
Hand is expressing the familiar jurisprudential axiom com-
mon in Western Civilization from Plato and Socrates, through
Augustine and Aquinas: the health of a society depends not on
the quantity nor even the quality of its laws, but upon the values
the laws presuppose and express. When laws no longer express
and embody these values, they become empty forms-social
pathology. Both politicians and citizens today are thoroughly
confused because they believe in nothing and they stand for noth-
ing except self-serving and personal gain. This pathology results
from an absence of common, shared moral beliefs about the role
of man in society.
More seriously, when a people can no longer agree on objec-
tive norms of right and wrong, this in turn does away with any
agreement on the notion of justice that is the life blood of the
laws. More and more in the United States, moral principles are
considered quaint and philosophically meaningless, with the re-
sult that the spirit of the laws is fundamentally eroded. What is
taking the place of the "force" of law is no longer its rightness but
its actual coercive force, which is the nemesis of the truly free
society.
The commitment to freedom requires self-discipline and sac-
rifice, and has always exemplified virtue in the lives of the men-
tors of society. Presently, this spirit in America is openly mocked,
all the way from professional sports to taxpayer revolts. The gos-
pel today is "self-gratification now," with "courts" beginning to
rule and legislate over almost every aspect of life. This relegation
of responsibility by the citizen to courts is formal at best, and the
sign of lack of moral commitment at worst. The laws' values are
first manifested in the quality of the citizens' lives, and only later
can they be embodied in laws or a constitution. Reversing the
process not only reverses the order of traditional Western juris-
prudence, it places an unbearable weight on the laws and the
courts. Collapse of a free society is then imminent.
9. L. HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 164 (I.. Dillard ed. 1960).
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To put the problem in another perspective, what can hold
citizens to their hard duties of personal responsibility, integrity,
and obligation to the common good? Traditionally, it has been
the life of virtue, manifested in the concrete lives of citizens and
nurtured in families and in educational systems. It does little
good at this point to state that our educational institutions teach
nothing of civic virtue-when they teach at all.0 More seriously,
the fractured family life in America is in danger of a complete
breakdown in teaching the young the fundamental moral values
basic to a free and democratic society.
The recent Watergate event evidences this lack of moral di-
mension in modem society. Shame, the public acknowledgment
of a moral or political failing, seems to be dead in those who
perpetrated Watergate. Former prominent administration mem-
bers, accused or convicted of common crimes, grow rich on profits
from books and lectures. The former President blends easily into
a position of elder statesman, receiving confidential information
and giving advice on matters of state. Members of the intellectual
and political elites, whose judgments on Vietnam proved consis-
tently wrong and whose policies proved disasterous for the coun-
try, remain members of the elite in good standing. Thus, the
demarcation between right and wrong, both morally and intellec-
tually-with all the terrible consequences which that entailed in
Vietnam and Watergate-is a minor accident, temporarily em-
barrassing and better forgotten by the country. Moral and intel-
lectual indifference is accepted as the virtue of mercy. What is
so terrible about these incidents of national disgrace is that there
is no clear awareness of the difference between vice and virtue.
In fact, even the great "Civil Rights" Movement, which has
expanded into almost every aspect of life-minorities, homosex-
uals, the handicapped, women, the mentally retarded, prison-
ers-has overlooked other important dimensions of the healthy
society: responsibility, obligation, and duty, which are the result
of virtue, discipline, and sacrifice-words seldom heard in the
vast litigation about everybody's "rights." This is not to say, of
course, that the Civil Rights Movement is not a positive good;
10. This was not always so. In the early 19th century, the Northwest Ordinance put
it this way: "Religion, morality, and knowledge being essential to good government and
the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encour-
aged." Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 51n (ordinance for the government of the Northwest
Territory enacted by Congress on July 13, 1787), reprinted in H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 128, 131 (9th ed. 1973). What remains today is only the last, which
is itself seen as a substitute for virtue. Historically, of course, little correlation exists
between intelligence and virtue.
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only that society's progress in this area at all is in direct propor-
tion to the virtue, decency, and compassion of all citizens-a
spirit not nurtured in legislation or lawsuits, but in the quality
of the citizens' lives. In this sense, Justice Frankfurter was on
target when he said: "Civil liberties draw at best only limited
strength from legal guaranties."" The protection of the poor, the
minorities, and the physically and mentally handicapped resides
first in the moral lives of free citizens and only then in the laws.
Or as James Madison put it: "To suppose that any form of gov-
ernment will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the
people, is a chimerical idea.' 12
Law, then, intimately depends upon a people's moral sense.
The jurisprudence of the Middle Ages was correct in thinking in
terms of reconciling and harmonizing. It must be the virtue in the
people and the people's ability to sacrifice for the common good
that restrains man's natural self-seeking. Only this will ensure
civil peace and harmony.
Civilized society cannot function effectively without peace
and control. The weighing of competing claims, which is the basic
function of courts and legal reality, cannot lead to peace unless
the people morally are disciplined to self-sacrifice in the interest
of all, so that everyone's claim and interest can be satisfied as
much as possible within the narrow confines of limited resources.
This perennial balancing of individual rights and social responsi-
bility can, in a democracy, be reconciled freely only when a moral
sense reposes in the people as a whole. When this is lacking, order
is imposed from above by the choice of a few, and tyranny and
authoritarianism results. That is why democracy is always so
precarious and why it needs continuous reaffirmation: it depends
for its survival on this moral sense of a people as a whole, not on
order imposed from above.
Here lies the essential distinction between democracy and
tyranny. If there is no compromise on the exercise of right, in view
of the whole, if rights are carried to their logical conclusion with-
out limitation, the pressure of unsecured claims and unsatisfied
demands will continue until revolution occurs or the civil peace
is destroyed and is again imposed from above by another and
stronger group. This balance of individual rights and social re-
sponsibility and limitation, in a democracy, can only be bridged
by the delicate moral sense of a people taught discipline and self-
11. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 555 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
12. Speech delivered at the Virginia Convention, June 1788.
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denial by a life of virtue; absent this morality, social order and
peace will be imposed, destroying the former to preserve the
higher value of the latter.
With the traditional undergirding of law (virtue) effectively
undermined, something must take its place to insure the legal
order's efficacy. What has resulted from the great Civil Rights
Movement is that litigation and legislation have taken the place
of moral attentiveness. Accordingly, litigation and the courts-
with their own brand of social philosophy and juridical activism
-began to rule society, from integrating schools and locker
rooms to challenging the latest ban on certain foods and drink.
The courts now are seen as the arena where civility and decency
are nurtured, and the people are stripped of the ability to rule
themselves and to determine their own destiny. The world of
wrongs will be set right by even more litigation and more inter-
vention by courts in the citizens' lives. The law's "force" will be
the rightness of law passed and consented to not by the people
and their representatives, but by orders of the courts. This new
religion has its own Bible: the Constitution; it has its "decrees"
issued by the courts for the salvation of all; it has its inspiration
in the Court's interpretation-or more correctly, re-
interpretations-of the Constitution's due process clause; it de-
mands "obedience" to its orders and to the "rights" it "finds" in
the Constitution; and it has its decalogue promulgated by "the
Fathers" in the Bill of Rights. Finally, the citizenry must accept
all this by faith in a Supreme Court which pronounces ex
Cathedra. No medieval papacy could have asked for more than
this secular religion. And no reasoning could be more circular.
The result is to put the cart before the proverbial horse. The
law, or the Constitution, can instruct us about our moral-and
only then, about our legal-responsibilities, but the law
presupposes a sense of morality, virtue, and decency in the citi-
zens. It does not and cannot create these senses contrary to the
rush by lawyers and law students to set the world right by more
and more litigation. Such is not the task of the law. The present
backlash against the courts and their independence should be
instructive in this regard.
A view of justice always precedes and underlies all legislation
and orders of courts. We have forgotten Justice Frankfurter's
vital insight when he said that "the ultimate reliance for the
deepest needs of civilization must be found outside their vindica-
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tion in courts of law."' 3 It must be found in the concrete, moral
lives of the citizen who lives these values before they can ever be
legislated or ordered by courts; it is a reliance on agreed, moral
values, concretely lived, on what the ancients called "virtue" that
alone is the safe foundation of a free society's legal order. Citizens
must agree not on vague notions of right and wrong, but on some
very definite notions of what is objectively right and wrong. This,
of course, does not preclude disagreements about concrete poli-
cies and applications, but if the moral foundation is not there, the
legal order builds on shifting sand. Given the hedonism and "self-
gratification now" philosophy so prevalent and deeply ingrained
in American society, one wonders whether our free society can
long endure. Perhaps this is unduly pessimistic, but one can see
this lack of moral dimension in almost all the institutions suppos-
edly responsible for its communication: the family, the schools,
the government, the courts, and the service professions (law and
medicine).
III.
These observations lead to the logical question of the law's
moral foundation for only with such a foundation can the law lay
claim to the citizens' allegiance. It is a profound question, one to
which both the Judeo-Christian ethic and Greek philosophy give
birth." Every society of the ancient world-Roman, Assyrian,
Egyptian, Macedonian-founded law on the divine prerogative of
the King, Emperor, or Pharaoh. Although Plato and Aristotle
attempted to give law a moral foundation that is found in the
virtuous citizen,'5 neither claimed any higher foundation of law
against which law would be measured regarding its moral, as
distinguished from its valid, qualities. The Emperor's word was
law because he was the viceroy of the Divinity. No other founda-
13. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 556 (1951).
14. See P. RIGA, supra note 1, at 22-50.
15. Next in order, . . . comes the principle that...
the state which is morally best is the state which is happy and 'does well.' To
'do well' is impossible unless you also 'do right'; and there can be no doing right
for a state, any more than there can be for an individual, in the absence of
goodness and wisdom. The fortitude of a state, and the justice and wisdom of a
state, have the same energy, and the same character, as the qualities which
cause individuals who have them to be called brave, just and wise.
AmSToTi, THE PoLmcs 281-82 (E. Baker ed. and trans. "1946)(footnotes omitted). The
study of ethics may be termed a study of politics. AmIsTOTLE, THE RHurowc bk. I, ch. 2,
para. 7, at 1356a. Ethics, according to Aristotle, may be so termed because politics is the
art or science of producing a good community, and ethics is the art or science of producing
a good man.
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tion of law was needed. Christianity challenged the divine foun-
dation of Caesar's legislative power by appealing to natural law
or justice because a higher foundation of law was necessary if
allegiance was to be expected of Christians living in the Empire.' 6
But it also was clear that law itself could not be identified with
the Divinity or God. Law itself is judged by reference to objective
norms of right and wrong.
The American experiment was no exception to this Judeo-
Christian Tradition. In the eighteenth century the Founding Fa-
thers stated: "We hold these truths to be self evident that all men
are created equal and that they are endowed by their Creator
.:. ..,17 If the Founding Fathers were pragmatic in their dealings
with government, they were not pragmatists for whom there were
no truths. These writers of the Declaration of Independence held
certain truths and claimed an Absolute as their foundation that
gave the citizens' allegiance its basic moral character. This alle-
giance went to the underlying right of persons, not to the struc-
ture of a government whose function simply would be to insure
these rights. When government no longer performed this ancillary
function, it was a moral nullity and citizens had a moral obliga-
tion to overthrow it.
In an age when all this seems rather quaint and is rejected
in legal and intellectual circles, it is crucial to ask, what is to be
substituted in place of an objective moral order that will claim
the same allegiance? If the laws and the Constitution are no
longer linked with enduring moral norms, our national legal phi-
losophy has become pragmatic and no longer worthy of the tradi-
16. For a fuller development, see Riga, The Christian and Politics, 12 WORLDVIEW 11-
15 (Oct. 1969). The later Christians attempted to establish this political allegiance of
Christians on more specific foundations. For instance, we have the testimony of the
theologian-lawyer, Henry of Bracton: "[NJec [leges] a corona separari poterunt cum
faciant ipsam coronam, quia leges faciunt regem." II DE LEolBus Er CONSUErUDtNmUS
ANGLIAE 167 (G. E. Woodbine ed. 1922)(author's trans.: The King ought not to be under
a man, but under God and under the law, because the law makes the King). St. Thomas
Aquinas bases allegiance to law on fidelity to right reason which is the reflection of the
divine in human life (natural law). That is why Aquinas calls law an "edict of reason":
"Rationis est enim ordinare ad finem, qui est primum principium in agendis .... Unde
relinquitur quod lex sit ali quid pertinens ad rationem." SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, q. 90,
art. 1. In other words, God and law were somehow linked and law was judged as just or
unjust in relationship to those norms of natural justice, natural law, etc. When allegiance
to law is ultimately dependent upon the institutions of government or a majority of people
(legal positivism) there can be no allegiance to law properly speaking. The only difference
between an acceptance of slavery and its rejection would be 600,000 Civil War dead and
the will of the greater force, not the vision that slavery was and is morally wrong.
17. The Declaration of Independence (adopted July 4, 1776, by the Continental Con-
gress), reprinted in H. COMMAGER, DocuMENTS OF AMERICAN HISToRY 100 (9th ed. 1973).
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tional allegiance of citizens. The basic question today is whether,
rejecting appeal to civil disorder and anarchy, the legal order is
or can be subject to the moral allegiance of citizens, and if so, on
what basis. If "reverence for law" is based on what a Supreme
Court says law is, or if the allegiance to law is based on the fact
that it is the "value of values"' 8 with no definition of that value,
then we are both intellectually and morally bankrupt-we have
no moral vision and the laws have no more force or allegiance for
citizens.
The history of American governmental institutions as inter-
preters of law is much too spotty to lead to any other conclusion
than that such a basis is precarious at best. Those who give an
unqualified allegiance to the Constitution certainly do not mean
the original Constitution, because it permitted slavery until 1808
and counted a slave as 3/5 of a free person for purposes of repre-
sentation in Congress until 1865. Chief Justice Taney was histori-
cally correct when he said in the majority opinion of Dred Scott"
that there was ample evidence that the Founding Fathers at the
Constitutional Convention did not consider slaves as persons.2 " In
this view, when law is stripped of its moral underpinnings, it is
merely the product of specific government institutions that enjoy
power under the Constitution. The slavery question aside, there
are other, grievous moral aberrations that make one doubt the
wisdom of an allegiance based on such a problematical founda-
tion.
The history of the Indian nations is another example. In spite
of Worcester v. Georgia,2 upholding Indian treaties and Indian
rights to lands in Georgia, when President "Sharp Knife" Jack-
son summarily removed all Indians beyond the Mississippi in
1832, there was no protest from the Court. In spite of the bloody
Civil War and its Constitutional aftermath in the fourteenth
amendment, the Court could find no evil in Louisiana's "separate
but equal" treatment of black citizens.22 The irrational fear and
hatred of Mormons toward the end of the nineteenth century was
confirmed by the Court in Reynolds v. United States2' and Davis
v. Beason.24 Nor can any minority ever again be at perfect legal
18. A. BICKEL, THE MouALrY oF CONSENT 56 (1975).
19. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
20. Id. at 404-05.
21. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
22. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
23. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
24. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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ease in the United States after Korematsu v. United States, 2'
which sanctioned the removal, during World War II, of Japanese
Americans who had not been convicted or even suspected of un-
patriotic acts or sentiments from their homes and farms on the
West Coast and their confinement to concentration camps in the
interior of the country.
In these and many other instances, it should be clear that
Bickel's "value of values" (law) and Holmes' view of law as the
correspondence to the actual equilibrium of force in the com-
munity-that is, conformity to the wishes of the dominant
power,26 lack serious moral foundation for the allegiance of citizen
to law. Indeed, they invite a cynicism of a macht recht variety
where law is imposed by the will of a majority, or more specifi-
cally, by the views of a particular makeup of the Court's majority.
The Medieval legal legacy, on the other hand, founded law
in intellect and reason, and depended for its ultimate validity and
allegiance on something more solid than willful majorities or con-
certed minorities. The difference always was made between the
consensus and the consent of the governed. Consent was a prag-
matic step, to insure the self government of a people. Consensus
involved principles, moral in nature and generally agreed upon by
the people, upon which and for which they established a covenant
in the first place. This societal covenant gave the people an ident-
ity and a direction in history, not least of which was a sense of
community, that is, they shared something basic and profound.
Given the multiplicity and grievousness of the errors of all
branches of our government institutions, the rule of law, if it is
to be worthy of the faith of citizens, must be something other than
the will of those with power within a state, even if they are a
majority. Repressive and unjust laws too often have seen birth in
the Halls of Congress and too often have been given the Supreme
Court's imprimatur for citizens to take Bickel or Holmes seri-
ously. The only escape from this dilemma is to recognize that
some connection must exist between law and enduring moral
norms, in function of which the performance of government offi-
cials can be judged. Otherwise we are back to the Kaisar Kurios
jurisprudence of the Judeo-Christian world, where some sort of
vague faith in governmental institutions will insure the validity
25. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
26. See generally Note, Holmes, Pierce and Legal Pragmatism, 84 YALE L.J. 1123
(1975). This view is not unopposed in American legal circles. John Rawls, for example,
bases justice on a social contract theory and not on inherent rights that give dignity to
each and every human being. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 158 (1971).
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of, and the allegiance to, the law. No healthy, free society estab-
lished on such a precarious foundation can long endure.
Some authors have seen this dilemma and have attempted
to find a solution in a "due process" justification. As Charles
Frankel put it:
The aspiration towards it [liberal constitutionalism] is central
in the assertion that all men should be credited with the rights
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These are not logi-
cally self-evident rights. They are not rights whose inviolability
can be ascertained independently of any conception of the social
purpose,.... But these rights will be self-evident in the quite
ordinary, non-technical sense of the term, to men and women
who wish to be independent, responsible, self-questioning
human beings. . .
Thus, Frankel requires as much an act of faith as any natural law
theoretician ever did. The short answer to this view is that there
are hundreds of millions of human beings who would disagree.
The logical answer is that such a foundation of faith in law is
much too precarious and unsure to support any citizen's alle-
giance. As Frankel puts it, such a cultivation of this liberal consti-
tutionalism permits the citizen to cherish this ideal of respect and
openness to differing viewpoints, "taking its side when sides must
be taken. 28 But this begs the very question under discussion:
what are the values onto which the citizen is supposed to hold,
for which he can "take sides" when necessary? Frankel sounds
like Bickel, who was convinced that "we can as a society and a
culture discover some boundaries"' to the meaning of the moral
realm. But there is an absence of values within the American
political and social system: we have no common moral vision or
principles that define us as community and give us a direction in
history. In short, as a nation, we believe in nothing communally
so we believe "in the law." But this is sheer nonsense because law
always is ancilliary to a basic moral value system that gives sig-
nificance to the whole legal system. "Reverence for law" has be-
come the new civil-secular religion, which attempts to unite the
nation after every other moral vision has been lost or discarded.
But "community" presupposes a people who share in common a
moral vision and who can embody this vision in its legal order.
27. Frankel, The Moral Environment of the Law, 61 MINN. L. REV. 921, 960 (1977).
28. Id. at 959.
29. A. BICKEL, supra note 18, at 83.
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Without moral vision, legal order is without meaning or founda-
tion.
Law becomes tyranny when there is no recognition of man's
authentic self in others, for then there is no sense of common
origin and destiny, and no reason to come together to debate and
decide the aims of society. Racism, bigotry, and nationalism kill
community because they kill communality, that is, they kill what
binds us together. It is only through communality that consensus
grows and a moral vision is born that can give birth to a practical
plan of action, politics, and law. Ethics, however, must precede
politics, or rather, in the words of Aristotle, politics is the practi-
cal translation of our ethics.
IV.
This relationship of law and morals has never been terribly
clear in the American mind. Legality and morality as two orders
of reality frequently have been confused in either of two ways.
First, there is a profound failure in understanding the true
meaning of the medieval adage: Whatever is right ought to be
law.3 The medieval man was not thinking of coercive statutes,
enforced by the state, that would compel the people to do what-
ever is right.' He was merely saying that whatever is right ought
to be a matter of custom; the moral order ought to be reflected
in the habitual order of everyday life and action.
Medieval man could also in good logic turn the adage around
and say: Whatever is law (custom) ought to be right. The sanc-
tion of the mores is not in the sheer fact that they prevail, but in
their rightness.3 2 As St. Thomas Aquinas would put it, it is right
30. See, e.g., SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-11, q. 91, arts. 1 & 2.
31. As this article stresses, the relation between law and morality is a complicated
one. That there is such a relationship has been the constant tradition of the West for over
seventeen hundred years. The law, said the medievals, exists somehow to make men
better. See generally SUMMA THEoLOGcA I-l1, q. 91, art. 2. If this is an exaggeration, surely
there is none in saying that the law is in some way a teacher of good and not simply a
threat of evil. To equate the illegal with what is immoral is surely an exaggeration since
one can easily conjure up a situation where something is both legal and immoral (legaliza-
tion of prostitution) and still be perfectly good law; and illegal but moral (as an employer
in interstate commerce who would set up an independent retirement plan by diverting
obligatory social security contributions). If this were not so, then the whole of the Ameri-
can tradition of civil disobedience to force attention to the injustice of the law, would make
no sense.
32. Once again, the master in the field is Thomas Aquinas:
Whether it belongs to human law to repress all vices?
Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain,
but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to
[Vol. 2:269
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to obey the law, not because it commands, but because what it
commands objectively is right. In both cases, medieval man was
expressing, quite exactly, a correct concept of the distinction and
relation between the order of the moral law and the order of
human law or custom. In American history, however, a perverted
sense of the adage has been frequent. It chiefly appears in the
reformer's constant shout: "There ought to be a law." That is,
whenever it appears that some good thing needs doing, or some
evil needs to be done away with, the immediate cry is for the arm
of the law. There is often no pause to ask whether this is the sort
of good or evil with which law can, or ought to, cope.
The other side of the adage is: Whatever is moral ought to
be legislated. The simplicity of this adage reveals the failure to
grasp the difference between moral precepts and civil statutes.
Because law proceeds from and reflects a people's moral
sense-no more, no less-law is a moral consensus of the people.
Consequently, the "force" of law proceeds from its rightness and
the consensus of the people, not from force. The law is seen to be
right; therefore, it is obeyed. In obeying, the citizen exercises
virtue, not constraint. But, because of the complexity of human
existence, not every evil is susceptible of being remedied by law.
When law attempts to be everywhere pervasive, it is nowhere
effective except as form of force and totalitarianism. This is no
longer virtue, but powerlessness.
Second, this confusion leads to another. If what is moral
ought by that fact to be legal, it follows that what is legal is by
that fact also moral. In common speech, if it is not against the
law, it is all right.33 Here the confusion is complete. Law is de-
prived of all true sanction from the order of morals.3' Morality is
invoked to sanction any kind of law. As a result, both law and
morality lose all meaning. This is why juridical positivism can
abstain.
SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, q. 96, art. 2.
33. This is a popular interpretation of Holmes' positivist philosophy. The real Holmes
is much more nuanced than this original caricature. "The law is the witness and external
deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the race.
The practice of it ... tends to make good citizens and good men." Holmes, The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897). Aquinas would not disagree.
34. This became evident in the aftermath of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Gallup
polls before the decision showed 50% of those polled opposed abortion on demand. THE
GALLUP OPINION INDEX REP. No. 54 at 19 (Dec. 1969). One year after the Roe decision the
number opposed had dropped to 44%. THE GALLUP OPINION INDEx RE,. No. 106 at 24 (Apr.
1974). By May of 1978, only 19% of those polled thought abortion should be illegal in any
circumstance. THE GALLUP OPINION INDEX RE'. No. 153 at 26 (May 1978).
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find no real argument with the former Nazi judges. They
"enforced the law" because the law had perfect validity; because
the judiciary only enforces valid law, the judges had no choice but
to commit the legal atrocities. If this reasoning seems somewhat
repugnant, it is because juridical positivism has no other answer;
it recognizes only validity, never morality, as an appeal to some
higher moral norm. Americans should not be surprised at the
judges' response at Nuremberg, because this was the response
of all the eminent American jurists of the early and middle nine-
teenth century concerning slavery.
American jurisprudence always has had particular difficulty
with the relationship between law and morals, between internal
and external standards. It was Mr. Justice Holmes who identified
"internal" with "moral," and "external" with "objective." Thus,
he gave moral standards only private application, and legal stan-
dards only public application. Accordingly, moral standards and
legal standards become mutually exclusive. Nowhere in Holmes
do we find any endeavor to relate the two-which accounts for his
impoverished definition of law:
It seems to me clear that the ultima ratio, not only regum but
of private persons is force, and that at the bottom of all private
relationships . . . is a justifiable self-preference.3
Holmes may have feared that to grant moral standards the same
status as legal standards would- have forced an assimilation of law
and morality. But this is to mistake the relationship: legal and
moral standards are both external because an inner process
stands in need of outward criteria. Some inner culpability always
is implied in the criminal law because that is what a community
does in establishing a criminal law in the first place: it forbids
certain actions because it considers them morally wrong and
those who do them, morally culpable. Even Holmes admits as
much:
Criminal liability, as well as civil, is founded on blameworthi-
ness. . . . A law which punished conduct which would not be
blameworthy in the average member of the community would
be too severe for that community to bear.3
It is for failure to relate internal and external standards that
Holmes' definition of law appears so impoverished.
The first requirement of any sound body of law is that it
35. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 38 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
36. Id. at 42.
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reflect the needs and desires of the people. This axiom, of course,
must be joined immediately with another, which is that law must
be, and appear to be, fair and just to the people for whom the law
is passed. The task of jurisprudence is to relate the "internal"
virtue of fairness and justice to the "external" embodiment of
these virtues in the law. Holmes could never relate these moral
notions to his "objective" legal rules.
Although he did not deal with it in any depth, Holmes did
at least see the problem. He fought the notion of law in Austin
who defined law simply as the will of the sovereign. 3 For Austin,
the sovereign relies on "private" standards for his com-
mands-the major reason Holmes opposed the whole notion of"private" moral standards. Thus, Holmes built his theory of legal
standards on the idea that objectivity can be gained only through
intersubjective agreement among members of a community. This
is known today as a consensus on the moral values that can and
should be translated into public law by the community's legisla-
tors. Holmes sowed the seeds of an interrelation between internal
and external standards, but unfortunately he never developed
them in a consistent way. In this sense, Holmes cannot be truly
termed a juridical positivist, yet it was his fear of "internal"
norms, at least as used by Austin, that accounted for his failure
to relate the two within a total and external consensus of the
community on the moral dimension of law itself. Holmes failed
to give a soul to the~whole body of law.
SOME CONCLUSIONS
Law and morality are indeed related, even though differen-
tiated. The premises of law ultimately exist in morality. Human
legislation looks to the moralization of society, which is a datum,
not an imposition. But, mindful of its own nature and mode of
action, law must not moralize excessively lest it defeat even its
own more modest aims by bringing the law into contempt. Thus,
in a free society law depends essentially on the people's moral
sense.
The law, therefore, mindful of its nature, must tolerate many
evils that morality condemns. A moral condemnation regards
only the evil itself. A legal ban on an evil must consider what St.
Thomas calls its own "possibilities. 38 That is, will the ban be
37. J. AUsTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 90-94 (1873).
38. SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, q. 91, arts. 4 & 5.
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obeyed by the generality? Will the moral sense of the community,
ut in pluribus, morally condemn this act? Is it, therefore, enforce-
able against the disobedient? Is it prudent to enforce this ban, in
view of the harmful effects in other areas of social life? Is the
instrumentality of coercive law a good means for the eradication
of this or that social vice? These are the questions that jurisprud-
ence must answer if legislation is to be drawn with requisite
craftsmanship.
Civil society demands order. In its highest phase of freedom,
it demands that order should not be imposed from the top down,
but should flower outward from free obedience to restraints and
imperatives stemming from inwardly possessed moral principles.
In this sense, law is more than an executive and valid order
backed by force; it is a spiritual and moral enterprise, and its
success depends upon the virtue of the people who are called upon
to obey it.
Men who would be politically free must discipline them-
selves. Political freedom is endangered in its foundations as soon
as the universal moral values, upon whose shared possession the
self-discipline of a free society depends, are no longer vigorous
enough to restrain the passions and shatter the selfish inertia of
men." The force of law, the sanction of the law, is not in the sheer
39. This relation of basic, objective moral norms and law was one of the principal
points of the controversial speech delivered by Alexander Solzhenitsyn at Harvard Univer-
sity, Cambridge, Massachusetts, on June 8, 1978. Solzhenitsyn, A World Split Apart,
reprinted in 44 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 678-84 (Sept. 1978). When Solzhenitsyn re-
marks that in the West "the letter of the law... is considered to be the supreme solution"
to conflict and that "everyone operated at the extreme limit of the legal frames," his
objection goes to the heart of America's constitutional arrangements. The reliance is on
institutions instead of the formation of character by and through virtue. What is the
alternative for Solzhenitsyn? It is moral education that teaches reason to rule the passions.
The modern reliance on institutions, commerce and other substitutes for virtue implies a
separation of law and morality where there should be only a distinction. So Solzhenitsyn
sadly concludes that "everything beyond physical well being and accumulation of mate-
rial goods, all other human requirements and characteristics of a subtler and higher
nature, [arel left outside the range of attention of the state and the social system."
The present peril of the West, its weakness and uncertainty, may be traced to "the
very basis of human thinking in the past centuries," what Solzhenitsyn calls "rationalistic
humanism or humanistic autonomy: the proclaimed and enforced autonomy of man from
any higher force above him." He continues: "On the way from the Renaissance to our days
we have enriched our experience, but we have lost a concept of a Supreme Complete
Entity which used to restrain our passions and our irresponsibility." This loss-of the idea
of God, or of natural law in the classical understanding-is the "real crisis" of our time,
for "the split in the world is less terrible than the fact that the same disease plagues its
two main sections." (Russia and the United States).
What he is saying is that in losing its spiritual bearings, a society "which is based on
the letter of the law and never reaches any higher is scarcely taking advantage of the high
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fact that it prevails, but in its rightness. A human society is
inhumanly ruled when it is ruled only, or mostly, by fear or force.
The generality obeys good laws because they are good laws; they
merit and receive the community's consent as valid legal expres-
sions of the community's own convictions regarding what is just
or unjust, good or evil. In the absence of this consent, law either
withers away or becomes tyrannical. It is the function of prudence
in the organs of authority to provide for these ends
(jurisprudence). The delicate balance between individual rights
and social peace resides, in the final analysis, not in courts or
legislatures, but in the people's moral sense. At least in a democ-
racy, it resides in the people's capacity to sacrifice for the com-
mon good, a capacity termed "virtue."
Law reflects the communitv's moral consensus, and no law
can substitute for the soul of a society. Democracy precariously
balances individual rights and social responsibility. It expresses
itself in the legal order that, in turn, is founded on the moral
capabilities of its people. Democracy is as strong, and as weak,
as this basic capability.
Jurisprudence must reconcile this essential relationship be-
tween law and enduring moral norms. If it be denied that there
are any such norms the basis of any communality becomes ten-
uous at best and dangerous at worst. Respect of law and alle-
giance to law depends on how we answer this crucial question.
The decline of official government today in its democratic
form has a consequence transcending the confines of politics and
legality. In a secular age, men in the United States have expected
and worked for salvation through the democratic republic that
has given birth to a new secular religion, rather than through the
Kingdom of God and its expectation. Their expectations have
been disappointed at every level. The charisma of democracy,
with its faith in rationality and virtue in the masses, has not
survived the historic experiences of mass irrationality, the impot-
level of human possibilities . . . .And it will simply be impossible to survive the trials
of this threatening century with only the support of a legalistic structure." It is this
emphasis on the spiritual, the insistence that there is something higher and more impor-
tant than those things which our system has canonized, which has so disturbed Solzhenit-
syn's critics. Where there is no higher obligation, where legality is the highest goal and
nothing else is required, people are encouraged to operate "at the extreme limit of the legal
frames . . . .An oil company is legally blameless when it purchases an invention for a
new type of energy in order to prevent its use. A food-product manufacturer is legally
blameless when he poisons his product to make it last longer; after all, people are free not
to buy it." Thus, Solzhenitsyn has tersely summarized what has been said throughout
these pages.
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ence and corruption of democratic government. Its eschatological
expectations have come to naught, leaving a broad and deep
moral vacuum where there was once a firm belief and expecta-
tion, built not on firm and abiding moral values, but rather de-
rived from rational analysis.
The new secular religion has given us no faith, no sense of
expectation-only an emptiness. And no civilized government
not founded on a faith can long endure.
